Whether a decrypted application message is authentic: its inner Nostr event
id is canonical AND its pubkey matches the MLS-authenticated sender's
account identity (foundation/identity.md, protocol-core/group-messaging.md).
MLS authenticates who sent the bytes (the sender leaf); this binds the inner
author to that sender so a member can't forge another account's authorship.
A failure — including an unattributable sender (no leaf index) or a
non-conformant payload — is invalid_encoding; the message is dropped, never
delivered.
The sender leaf index refers to the ratchet tree of the epoch the message
was sent in. For a message from a past epoch that tree is the retained
historicalReceiverData entry, not state.ratchetTree: the sender may have
been removed (or the leaf reused) since. Pass messageEpoch so the right
tree is used; MDK reads the credential the same way (OpenMLS
ProcessedMessage::credential, cgka-engine/src/identity.rs).
Whether a decrypted application message is authentic: its inner Nostr event id is canonical AND its
pubkeymatches the MLS-authenticated sender's account identity (foundation/identity.md,protocol-core/group-messaging.md). MLS authenticates who sent the bytes (the sender leaf); this binds the inner author to that sender so a member can't forge another account's authorship. A failure — including an unattributable sender (no leaf index) or a non-conformant payload — isinvalid_encoding; the message is dropped, never delivered.The sender leaf index refers to the ratchet tree of the epoch the message was sent in. For a message from a past epoch that tree is the retained
historicalReceiverDataentry, notstate.ratchetTree: the sender may have been removed (or the leaf reused) since. PassmessageEpochso the right tree is used; MDK reads the credential the same way (OpenMLSProcessedMessage::credential,cgka-engine/src/identity.rs).